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This essay concerns two interrelated, persistent problems for privacy law. The first is 
the failure of academic scholarship to get adequately to grips with the meaning of 
privacy. The second is the apparent inability of the English judiciary to resolve the 
common law lacuna in respect of intrusion-type privacy violations. The two problems 
are related in that the former is a significant contributor to the latter.  
Mainstream scholarship has long insisted on pursuing the One True Meaning 
of Privacy, thereby overlooking valid, alternative conceptualisations and creating a 
melange of theories that provides little assistance to judges. However, by adopting a 
novel, triangulation-based approach to understanding privacy of the sort proposed 
herein, it is possible to locate points of consensus between these rival theories in respect 
of particular privacy-violating activities. This consensus can provide the certainty 





Two significant, interrelated problems in both legal scholarship and English common law 
doctrine relating to individual privacy rights have thus far received insufficiently focused 
attention. The first problem concerns privacy theory. It is an inability, in privacy scholarship, 
to get to grips properly with what ‘privacy’ means. Many scholars have attempted to define 
privacy.1 However, each mainstream privacy theory manages to cover only limited ground and 
they generally present as mutually exclusive. Thus, having failed in its own mission to provide 
a precise definition of privacy, mainstream scholarship seems unable to move beyond the 
impasse it has created. 
                                                          
* City Law School. Email: thomas.bennett.2@city.ac.uk. I am grateful to Kirsty Hughes, William Lucy, Ole 
Pedersen, Gavin Phillipson and Paul Wragg for their helpful comments on earlier versions. The essay has also 
benefitted considerably from the comments and criticisms from the two anonymous OJLS referees, to whom I 
express my thanks. 
1 This essay discusses contributions from some of the leading theorists in the privacy field. These theorists can, 
in large part, be considered to contribute to mainstream (western) privacy theory. However, it is not the aim of 
the essay to exhaustively examine all contributions to privacy theory. The aim is, rather, to point up an area of 
methodological similarity between leading mainstream theorists. 
The second problem is one of doctrine. It is the lack of a privacy tort of ‘intrusion into 
a person’s seclusion’ in English law. Intrusion-type violations of privacy are those that involve 
physical intrusions into personal space or property, as well as unwanted watching, recording 
or accessing of a person or their private information. It has been suggested that there have 
recently been some, limited indications that English courts are willing to recognise and remedy 
privacy violations that go beyond the doctrine of ‘misuse of private information’ (MPI) and 
which resemble pure intrusions.2 However, even brief scrutiny of such suggestions shows them 
to be premature. 
There are two key cases around which these suggestions centre. The first is the phone 
hacking case of Gulati v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd.3  In Gulati, damages were awarded to 
claimants whose voicemail accounts had been compromised by the defendant, even though 
much of the information thereby gleaned was never published. But to conclude from this case 
that English law now adequately guards against intrusions into privacy is premature for three 
reasons. First, the decision was rendered exclusively under the doctrine of MPI, and thus does 
not recognise a novel head of liability; there is no explicit acknowledgement by the court that 
finding the defendant liable in this case extends the law beyond its established limits. Second, 
even if there had been some expansion of the doctrine’s limits, Gulati would still be firmly 
focused on the obtaining of information; there is nothing in the case to suggest that an intrusion 
through which no information was obtained has become actionable. Third, although the level 
of damages awarded was confirmed on appeal, the issue of liability was uncontested even at 
first instance; the defendant admitted – perhaps unwisely – the its conduct amounted to a 
misuse of private information.4 
The second case giving rise to the impression, amongst some, that intrusion is now 
covered by English law is PJS v Associated Newspapers Ltd.5 In PJS, the Supreme Court 
continued an MPI injunction despite the information to which it related being in the public 
domain. In so doing, it cited heavily Tugendhat J’s first instance judgment in Goodwin v News 
                                                          
2 The term ‘misuse of private information’ first appears in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 
457, [14] (Lord Nicholls). 
3 [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2015] WLR(D) 232. Suggestions that Gulati exemplifies a novel, intrusion facet of 
the MPI doctrine can be found in NA Moreham, ‘Liability for listening: why phone hacking is an actionable 
breach of privacy’ (2015) 7(2) Journal of Media Law 155, and John Hartshorne, ‘The need for an intrusion upon 
seclusion privacy tort within English law’ (2017) 46(4) Common Law World Review 287. cf Jacob Rowbottom, 
‘A landmark at a turning point: Campbell and the use of privacy law to constrain media power’ (2015) 7(2) 
Journal of Media Law 170. 
4 See further Rowbottom, ibid. 
5 [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] 1 AC 1081. 
 
Group Newspapers Ltd in which he discussed frequent judicial uses of the term ‘intrusion’ at 
length.6 One scholar has recently suggested that the references to ‘intrusion’ in PJS indicate 
that MPI now ‘also covers intrusion’.’7 This is not the place in which to dissect PJS in detail, 
but we can briefly note that the court’s reference to ‘intrusion’ takes place in the context of a 
discussion of the intrusive impact upon the claimants’ family life that the publication of the 
information has had, and which further public discussion would generate – particularly online: 
‘if there was no injunction in this case, there would be greater intrusion on the lives of [the 
claimants] through the internet.’8 As in Gulati, there is no suggestion in the case that an MPI 
claim could succeed in a ‘pure’ intrusion situation where there was neither non-consensual 
acquisition nor dissemination of private information. As such, PJS cannot be said to have 
opened up the MPI doctrine into anything even close to a full-blown intrusion tort. 
Scholars have long lamented the intrusion lacuna in English law.9 However, not enough 
has been done to uncover the roots of English law’s failure to remedy it. One key factor – 
which has too often been overlooked – is the first problem outlined above: the conceptual 
difficulty that the seemingly amorphous term ‘privacy’ poses for common law judges. 
This conceptual difficulty is made all the more intense by the House of Lords’ judgment 
in Wainwright v Home Office.10 It is one of the few occasions upon which our highest court 
has rendered a judgment in a privacy case, and one of only two such cases where the very 
nature – and future direction – of English law’s privacy protections was in issue.11 In 
Wainwright, the House of Lords rejected the opportunity to develop a broad privacy tort and, 
by implication, further rejected the future potential to develop discrete heads of liability other 
than that which already existed (equitable confidentiality12). Giving the leading judgment, Lord 
Hoffmann expressly doubted the amenability of the term ‘privacy’ to legally useful definition: 
                                                          
6 [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB), [2011] EMLR 27, cited in PJS, ibid, at [58]-[59]. 
7 Paul Wragg, ‘Recognising a Privacy-Invasion Tort: The Conceptual Unity of Informational and Intrusion 
Claims’ (2019) 78(2) CLJ (forthcoming). 
8 PJS, n 5, [63]. 
9 See eg NA Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 LQR 
628. See also David Eady, ‘A statutory right to privacy’ (1996) 3 EHRLR 243, Basil Markesinis et al, ‘Concerns 
and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of 
Help)’ (2004) 52 American Journal of Comparative Law 133. 
10 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 (Wainwright). 
11 The second being Campbell (n 2). 
12 The relationship between equitable confidence and the ‘tort’ of ‘misuse of private information’ subsequently 
recognised in Campbell (ibid) – which may or may not be a tort at all – remains unclear. The leading judicial 
pronouncement on this relationship, in Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2016] QB 1003, fails 
to resolve the conceptual murkiness surrounding the elaboration of doctrine in this field. See Thomas DC 




The need in the United States to break down the concept of ‘invasion of privacy’ 
into a number of loosely-linked torts must cast doubt upon the value of any high-
level generalisation which can perform a useful function in enabling one to 
deduce the rule to be applied in a concrete case.13 
 
This is a powerful indicator to subsequent courts that the conceptual difficulties posed 
by the term ‘privacy’ may be overwhelming.14 For jurists, like the academic theorists, have 
struggled to define ‘privacy’ with precision. And when judges turn to the scholarly literature 
for assistance, they find an unhelpful melange of limited, seemingly mutually exclusive 
theories that is of little practical use. 
This essay sets out to solve the first problem, and in the process of so doing it hopes to 
lay some of the groundwork necessary for solving the second. Since the conceptual problem is 
a cause of the doctrinal one, the solution to the former will make a necessary (though not in 
itself sufficient) contribution to solving the latter.15 Thus, we will focus on a solution to the 
conceptual problem. This solution involves developing a new methodology for approaching 
the task of understanding privacy. To be clear, it is not another in the long line of efforts to 
locate the One True Meaning of privacy. The method espoused in this essay involves making 
use of the purportedly mutually exclusive mainstream theories and locating points of overlap 
between them. For it is at these points of overlap that we can locate sufficient consensus on the 
meaning of privacy to provide an adequate basis for the establishment of legal doctrine (eg in 
                                                          
13 Wainwright (n 10) [18]. 
14 In Campbell, ibid, Baroness Hale makes plain that the effect of Wainwright is to confirm that ‘the courts will 
not invent a new cause of action to cover types of activity which were not previously covered’ ([133]). 
15 The conceptual problem is not the only obstacle to the recognition of an intrusion tort in English law. 
However, the problem that the lack of conceptual consensus on privacy poses is nevertheless a significant 
factor, and one – moreover – which has received no detailed treatment (specifically in respect of common law 
development) in domestic privacy scholarship. Other concerns, such as the implications for the rule of law of the 
judicial development of a novel and controversial head of liability, also contribute to the stagnation of the law in 
this area. For instance, it is apparent that English courts in privacy cases have adopted a mode of developmental 
reasoning that tightly limits their capacity for recognising novel heads of liability. This mode of reasoning aligns 
broadly with accounts of ‘narrow incrementalism’, ‘gradualism’ and ‘minimalism’. I have written elsewhere on 
the pervasiveness of this sort of reasoning in English privacy law and of the stagnation of the law it engenders. 
(See Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Privacy and Incrementalism’ in András Koltay and Paul Wragg (eds), Research 
Handbook on Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (Edward Elgar 2020) (forthcoming).) I neither repeat 
nor extend that line of analysis here since my focus in this essay is on the conceptual rather than formal 
difficulties underpinning the non-development of an intrusion tort. See also Bennett, ‘Judicial Activism’ (n 12), 
and Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Privacy, third parties and judicial method: Wainwright’s legacy of uncertainty’ 
(2015) 7(2) Journal of Media Law 251. On ‘narrow incrementalism’ see Lesley Dolding and Richard Mullender, 
‘Tort Law, Incrementalism, and the House of Lords’ (1996) 47(1) NILQ 12. On ‘gradualism’, see Keith M 
Stanton, ‘Incremental Approaches to the Duty of Care’ in Nicholas Mullany (ed), Torts in the Nineties (North 
Ryde 1997). On ‘minimalism’, see Cass R Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme 
Court (Harvard University Press 2001). 
 
the form of novel heads of tort liability). This is a method that resembles the notion of ‘theory 
triangulation’ as set out by the sociologist Norman Denzin. As such, we will call it the 
‘triangulation method’. 
In order to make the argument, the essay proceeds through several stages. The first and 
second sections lay the conceptual groundwork necessary to make sense of the triangulation 
method outlined in the third. In the first section, the essay draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
account of ‘aspect perception’ and ‘aspect blindness’. This account is useful since it enables 
us, in the second section, to point up the nature of the difficulty encountered by scholars 
endeavouring to define privacy. In focusing on only one ‘aspect’ of privacy each, their 
individual theories exhibit ‘aspect blindness’ to alternative perspectives. This leads to the 
problem identified by Daniel Solove – that each of the mainstream theories is either too broad 
or too narrow.16 None manages to encapsulate the entirety of what privacy is whilst excluding 
non-privacy matters and, as a result, privacy scholarship is left in a state unhelpful to judges 
contemplating the expansion of common law privacy protections. 
With this groundwork in place, the essay proceeds, in the third section, to outline the 
proposed novel method for triangulating an understanding of privacy. It then exemplifies the 
way in which this method may be used to locate sufficient consensus between mainstream 
theories to enable the courts to be satisfied that behaviour that intrudes into a person’s personal 
space, property or affairs amounts to a violation of privacy. It does this by examining three 
cases as putative privacy violations. These are the English case of Kaye,17 the Canadian case 
of Jones18 and the New Zealand case of Holland.19 Each of these cases involves an intrusion 
into a person’s private space or affairs that would not attract liability under English tort law as 
it currently stands. Upon examination of them through the lens of the triangulation method, 
however, it becomes apparent that there is strong consensus between a number of scholars that 
the defendants in each of these cases committed a violation of the claimants’ privacy. 
The identification and exemplification of this triangulation method suggests that it 
ought to be possible, at a practical level, to develop legal doctrine capable of responding to 
unwarranted intrusions, notwithstanding the lack of agreement over the nature of ‘privacy’ at 
a higher level of philosophical abstraction. Thus, whilst the search for privacy’s ‘true’ nature 
                                                          
16 Daniel J Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2009) ch 2. 
17 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
18 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32, 108 OR (3d) 241. 
19 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
 
is almost certainly a false errand, it does not excuse the stagnation of the law in respect of 
remedying wrongful intrusions into individuals’ seclusion.20 
 
2. Aspect Perception and Aspect Blindness 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasises the importance of context in establishing a concept’s 
meaning. His accounts of ‘aspect perception’ and its correlative opposite, ‘aspect blindness’, 
highlight the necessity of prior experience for our ability to appreciate and comprehend 
complex concepts (of which privacy is an example). Introducing these accounts lays the 
necessary groundwork for the analysis of mainstream privacy scholarship that follows. 
In his later work, Wittgenstein explores the different ways in which we ‘see’ objects. 
In a famous example, he referred to Joseph Jastrow’s puzzle picture (which might be 
interpreted as depicting a duck or a rabbit).21 He noted that a person looking at the picture might 
initially see a duck, but then also ‘see’ a rabbit. Wittgenstein labelled each of these possible 
perceptions an ‘aspect’ of the picture. The form of the picture itself, lacking any objective 
meaning, is imbued with the meaning that the observer brings to it; ‘one [brings] a concept to 
what one sees’.22  The meanings we attribute to observable phenomena are neither objective 
nor fixed to the form in which we observe them. Thus, ‘one and the same content can 
intelligibly exhibit many alternative forms, which are themselves contingent.’23  
Wittgenstein realised that our ability to ‘see’ multiple aspects in the phenomena we 
observe is contingent upon our experience. An individual who has never encountered a rabbit 
would ‘see’ only a duck in the picture. We recognise that which we observe only because we 
are able to draw links between the observed and similar phenomena to which we have 
previously been exposed. Modern psychiatry concurs; as Arnold Modell explains, memory 
involves a metaphoric process whereby the mind unconsciously draws parallels between its 
own experience and apparently novel phenomena.24 Most – if not all – phenomena can thus be 
                                                          
20 Nor indeed to excuse the failure to develop further discrete heads of liability protecting privacy interests, such 
as those found in the USA. On the US position, see Restatement of the Law (Second): Torts (2d), vol 3 
(American Law Institute, 1977), and William Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48(3) Cal LR 383. 
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Revised 4th edn, GEM Anscombe, PMS Hacker and 
Joachim Shulte tr, PMS Hacker and Joachim Shulte eds, Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 204, para 118. The duck-rabbit 
grapheme first appears in Joseph Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology (London 1900) 295.  
22 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1 (GEM Anscombe and GH von 
Wright eds, GEM Anscombe tr, Basil Blackwell 1980) 169, para 961. 
23 Emilia Mickiewicz, ‘An Exploratory Theory of Legal Coherence in Canengus and Beyond’ (2010) 7 The 
Journal Jurisprudence 465, 474. 
24 Arnold H Modell, Imagination and the Meaningful Brain (MIT Press 2006). 
 
said to have multiple aspects.25 This account has clear relevance to our concerns about privacy. 
Mainstream efforts have tried but failed to identify a single, objective meaning for ‘privacy’ 
because, when we consider privacy, we do so bringing our own ‘aspect’ to bear upon it.  
Wittgenstein talks about the ‘field of a word’ (das Feld eines Wortes).26 By this he 
means a field of interpretative possibility; the normative space that the word creates and within 
which we may interpret it in different ways.27 The parameters of this field are flexible. It is 
constituted by the ways in which the word is generally used and understood – its users’ 
experiential background. Within this field there is plenty of room for ‘reasonable pluralism’.28 
Thus, for example, Alan Westin thinks privacy is to do with informational control.29 Paul 
Freund thinks it is about respect for ‘personhood’.30 Both conceive of privacy very differently 
– they perceive it as possessing different aspects. Nevertheless, they are likely also to share 
sufficient common ground to conduct a sensible discussion about privacy and indeed to 
recognise certain acts as violating privacy. The commentators’ common ground comes from 
overlaps in their individual (contingent) experiences of privacy. Assuming the commentators 
have grown up in the same or similar cultural circumstances, however, their experiences will 
share sufficient common ground to make potentially fruitful discussion of this sort possible. 
As Wittgenstein worked through his concept of aspect perception, he developed the 
further notion of ‘aspect blindness’.31 This would afflict a person who, by virtue of not having 
the necessary experience to appreciate a particular aspect, would be unable to ‘see’ it (as in our 
example of the person who had never encountered a rabbit). This notion proves illuminating 
when we use it to critique the various theories that claim fully to conceptualise privacy. For 
when we scrutinise them (in the next section), it will become apparent that, when they claim to 
secure a knock-out blow in terms of understanding privacy, they in fact exhibit symptoms of 
aspect blindness. These symptoms manifest as inattentiveness to the aspects of privacy 
identified by rival theories. 
                                                          
25 It does not really matter, for our purposes, whether any phenomena have objective meaning or whether all 
meaning is contingent upon the experience of the observer. For with many commonly-encountered phenomena, 
the experiences of those encountering them will be sufficiently similar that observers will perceive sufficiently 
similar aspects that communication will not be overly obstructed. In this way, commonly-encountered 
phenomena can, by virtue of the similar collective experience of those encountering them, be said to possess a 
sufficiently strong core of certain meaning to enable broad understanding. 
26 ibid para 297. (Original German text found on page 229, English translation on page 230.) 
27 On the nature of a field of interpretative possibility, see Richard Mullender, ‘Judging and Jurisprudence in the 
USA’ (2012) 75(5) MLR 914, 921-923. 
28 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1993). 
29 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (IG Publishing 1967). 
30 Paul Freund, Address to the American Law Institute, 23 May 1975. 
31 Wittgenstein (n 21) 225, para 206ff. 
Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect perception, then, shines light on the ways in which 
words may be interpreted in a variety of ways within their fields of interpretative possibility. 
Whether we are interpreting a simple noun, a duck-rabbit puzzle picture or a complex 
conceptual phenomenon such as privacy, we need to bring the field of interpretative possibility 
into view if we are to understand – as well as we are able – what we are observing or 
considering. If there appear to be multiple aspects of privacy, we should not simply assume 
that all but one aspect are ‘wrong’ in the manner that mainstream theorists often end up doing. 
Such an assumption is not only blind to other identifiable aspects of privacy, but denies that 
other aspects might exist. It thus dulls rather than enriches our understanding of privacy. It may 
not be legally convenient, but privacy is a pluralistic concept.32 And it behoves us to understand 
it as fully as we can. 
 
3. Privacy Theories as ‘Aspects’ 
 
In this section, we will see that mainstream theories tend to focus on one (or a very limited 
number) of privacy’s aspects.33 This suggests that these theories exhibit the symptoms of aspect 
blindness,34 and such a diagnosis explains their failure to locate a definitive understanding of 
privacy.35 The major exception to this tendency is found in the work of Daniel Solove, who 
expressly sets out to challenge the approach taken by mainstream scholars. However, as we 
shall see, Solove’s approach – whilst it has the benefit of recognising privacy’s pluralistic 
                                                          
32 Solove (n 16) 40. 
33 I do not claim that the way I categorise mainstream privacy theories is the only way in which they may be 
categorised. I simply adopt the categorisation that follows in order to highlight one set of distinctions between 
the aspects of privacy upon which scholars agree and disagree. Alternative categorisations might well point up 
further aspects of privacy, which would only further demonstrate its pluralistic nature. 
34 I do not suggest that the theorists themselves personally suffer from aspect blindness. This would be 
impossible to prove (and, no doubt, offensive). Instead I make the less pointed claim that, in purporting to 
exclude the possibility of rival theories being valid, these mainstream theories manifest a lack of attentiveness to 
any aspects of privacy other than the one (or the limited number) upon which they themselves fasten. 
35 There is broad similarity between my approach and that which Solove advocates in Understanding Privacy (n 
16). However, there are two key differences between Solove’s approach and mine. First, my approach is 
informed by an understanding of ‘aspect perception’ and ‘aspect blindness’, derived from Wittgenstein’s work. 
Whilst Solove draws on Wittgenstein in his book, he draws only on Wittgenstein’s theory of ‘family 
resemblances’. As such, his work does not attribute the faults he finds in mainstream privacy scholarship with 
an inattentiveness to context in quite the same way that my approach does, though there is nothing in his critique 
that is incompatible per se with my approach. Second, when I utilise the ‘triangulation’ method (see section 3, 
below), I look for areas of overlap between the theorists I have examined. Whereas Solove seeks to cast aside 
scholarship that he finds methodologically limited, I seek to make use of it whilst acknowledging its 
deficiencies. 
 
nature – leads him to reject mainstream scholarship entirely. This is unfortunate. For 
considerable value remains in the observations of those whose work he rejects. 
 
A. Singular Theories 
 
Singular or ‘top-down’36 theories insist that privacy can be conceptualised properly only by 
locating a common denominator between all matters private. Singular theorists see privacy as 
a single distinct right or interest, often underpinned by a distinct value. Thus, for some, privacy 
interests are linked by virtue of the type of thing being interfered-with, such as private 
information.37 For others, this common denominator is a more abstract value, such as respect 
for individuals’ ‘personhood’.38 Whatever the common denominator proposed, however, the 
analytic method of the singular theorists is essentially the same. They seek the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of privacy, such that they can define the concept in a way that enables us 
to include and exclude matters that fit and do not fit (respectively) with the definition. There 
are many such theories which we will not attempt to list exhaustively; we will instead pick out 
some prominent examples. 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, who borrowed a phrase from Thomas Cooley that 
was to become synonymous with their work, argued for greater protection for ‘the right to be 
let alone’, which they attributed to a principle of ‘inviolate personality’.39 Edward Bloustein, 
making use of this principle, gives a deontological account of privacy, focusing on ‘the 
individual’s independence, dignity and integrity; [which] defines man’s essence as a unique 
and self-determining being.’40 Stanley Benn, whose theory is grounded in similar deontological 
                                                          
36 Solove (n 16) 9. 
37 Theorists who conceptualise privacy as the interest in controlling information about oneself fall into this 
category. It is a point of commonality between the view of privacy as the ability to maintain secrecy, and that of 
privacy as a broader interest in controlling personal information (views which are otherwise in a number of 
ways divergent). The notion of privacy as an ability to maintain secrecy is espoused by scholars including 
Richard A Posner (The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1981) 272-273; Economic Analysis of 
Law (5th edn, Aspen Publishers Inc 1998) 46), Sidney M Jourard (‘Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy’ 
(1966) 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 307) and Amitai Etzioni (The Limits of Privacy (Basic Books 
1999)). The notion of privacy as control over a broader class of personal information is preferred by scholars 
such as Alan Westin (Privacy and Freedom (IG Publishing 1967)), Charles Fried (‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale LJ 
475) and Richard B Parker (‘A Definition of Privacy’ (1974) 27(2) Rutgers Law Review 275, 277). 
38 Roscoe Pound, ‘Interests of Personality’ (1915) 28 Harv L Rev 343, 363; Paul Freund, Address to the 
American Law Institute, 23 May 1975. 
39 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193, 195 and 205; 
Thomas McIntyre Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts: Or the Wrongs which Arise Independent of Contract 
(2nd edn, Callaghan & Co. 1888) 29. 
40 Edward J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39 New 
York University LR 962,  971. 
 
territory, sees privacy as safeguarding ‘respect for [a person] as one engaged on a kind of self-
creative enterprise’.41 Building upon this, Paul Freund sees privacy as primarily concerned with 
the protection of ‘personhood’.42 
Some see privacy as more instrumental. These theorists tend to focus on control over 
private information. Thus, for Alan Westin, ‘[p]rivacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others.’43 For Charles Fried, ‘[p]rivacy is … the control we have over 
information about ourselves.’44 Richard Parker’s conceptualisation of privacy sits between this 
group (control over information) and another (limited access to the self). For Parker, privacy 
is concerned with control over something broader; it includes ‘control over when and by whom 
the various parts of us can be sensed by others.’45  
It is actually this aspect of privacy – control over information – that English courts have 
latched onto in deploying equitable confidentiality as a privacy-protecting device, and in 
developing MPI. In Campbell, Lord Hoffmann focused on this aspect of privacy, stating that 
the cause of action being developed 
 
focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – the right to control 
the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the 
esteem and respect of other people.46 
 
                                                          
41 Stanley I Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons’ in Nomos XIII: Privacy (J Roland Pennock and 
John W Chapman eds, Atherton Press 1971) 26. 
42 Freund (n 38). 
43 Westin (n 37) 7. 
44 Fried (n 37) 482-483. 
45 Parker (n 37) 281. Parker elaborates: ‘By “sensed,” is meant simply seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted. 
By “parts of us,” is meant the parts of our bodies, our voices, and the products of our bodies. “Parts of us” also 
includes objects very closely associated with us. By “closely associated” is meant primarily what is spatially 
associated. The objects which are “parts of us” are objects we usually keep with us or locked up in a place 
accessible only to us. In our culture, these objects might be the contents of our purse, pocket, or safe deposit 
box, or the pages of our diaries.’ 
   Priscilla Regan adopts this sort of definition of privacy (see Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, 
and Public Policy (University of North Carolina Press 1995) 4). Although her adoption of it does not amount to 
a ringing endorsement, her main concern is with the manner in which privacy’s value is conceptualised, and not 
the way in which privacy itself is defined. 
46 Campbell (n 11) [51]. Baroness Hale likewise described equitable confidentiality as embracing ‘the protection 
of the individual’s informational autonomy’, in the course of distinguishing this aspect of privacy from ‘the sort 
of [physical] intrusion into what ought to be private which took place in Wainwright’ (an improperly conducted 
strip-search – to which she says that English law is ‘powerless to respond’ at [133]-[134]). 
 
A further group of singular theorists focus on privacy as a limit upon accessibility.47 
Ruth Gavison separates the concept of privacy (neutral and purely descriptive) from the value 
of privacy (which provides prescriptive guidance on how to balance it against competing 
interests).48 For her, privacy is the condition of ‘limited access’ of others to the self, comprising 
‘three independent and irreducible elements: secrecy, anonymity and solitude.’49 Here, ‘limited 
access’ becomes the common denominator – the singular ‘essence’ of privacy.50 Nicole 
Moreham argues for a modification to Gavison’s conceptualisation, suggesting that the 
‘inaccess’ should be ‘desired’.51 This is in order to avoid the incongruity of a person who is 
stranded down a well being described as experiencing perfect privacy.52 
Arnold Simmel and Kirsty Hughes draw on behavioural and social science in order to 
refute the notion that privacy can be conceptualised independently from its role in society.53 
They both identify a particular aspect of privacy: privacy as an aspect of the self in interaction 
with others.54 Moreover, this aspect contains a distinctive feature: it conceptualises privacy as 
created and maintained by the use of ‘barriers’. 
Simmel, a sociologist, observes that individual privacy interests exist within a 
‘continual competition with society over the ownership of our selves.’55 He identifies 
‘boundaries’ and individual choice (the desire to maintain these boundaries) as the cornerstones 
of privacy’s existence. 
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Every assertion of our right to personal privacy is an assertion that anyone 
crossing a particular privacy boundary is transgressing against some portion of 
our self.56 
 
For Simmel, the individual’s own understanding of her self is contingent upon social 
interaction. But whilst ‘[w]e need to be part of others … we need also to confirm our 
distinctness from others, to assert our individuality’.57 Individual development, in the context 
of social interaction, requires the effective maintenance of boundaries, to ‘develop, over time, 
a firmer, better constructed, and more integrated position in opposition to the dominant social 
pressures.’58 Not all boundaries are physical; social norms play a boundary-determining role.59 
Thus, in determining how it is that individuals come to respect each other’s boundaries, ‘[w]e 
have to look for the answer … in the structure of society, the patterns of interaction, the web 
of norms and values.’60  
Hughes’ conceptualisation of privacy shares a number of features with Simmel’s work. 
Drawing on social interaction theory, her work also overlaps in many instances with that of 
Gavison and Moreham. Indeed we might also see it (just as we might see Simmel’s) as an 
extension of the basic premise that privacy concerns the limitation of access to the self.61  
Hughes emphasises the centrality of experience to understanding privacy. Like Simmel, 
the experience which is of utmost relevance to her is that of the interaction between the 
individual and others in society. Privacy cannot, in her view, be understood in isolation from 
society, arguing that ‘[i]nstead of regarding privacy as an individualistic right, we need to 
appreciate the fundamental role that privacy plays in facilitating social interaction.’62 Drawing 
on the social interaction research of Irwin Altman, Hughes presents a privacy theory based on 
the notion of ‘barriers’.63  
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The three types of barriers identified by Hughes are: ‘(i) physical barriers; (ii) 
behavioural barriers; and (iii) normative rules (which also act as a form of barrier).’64 Hughes 
explains that the ‘normative rules … may derive from a number of sources including social 
practices and codified rules, such as laws or codes of practice.’65 She conjectures that, if 
normative barriers were not protected by law, individuals would become over-cautious, 
deploying increasingly drastic methods to protect their privacy. This would, she cautions, 
‘[r]equir[e] individuals to be ‘on guard’ [and] is likely to break down trust and community, as 
neighbours and citizens are all characterised as potential intruders.’66  
Each of these singular theories, then, adopts the same basic methodology. They focus 
on one aspect of privacy and treat all others as either wrong or unnecessary. But there is clear 
disagreement between the writers in term of substance. The aspects they identify differ, and no 
one aspect manages to satisfy all contributors to the debate (indeed, it seems unlikely that any 
singular theory would manage to satisfy even a single other commentator in the debate). 
 
B. Reductionist Theories 
 
Reductionist theorists refute the idea that privacy can be usefully conceptualised as a distinct 
right or interest.67 Instead, they see it as encompassing a cluster (or set of clusters) of discrete 
interests. As such, they see talking of ‘privacy’ as if it were distinct to be ‘pointless, a waste of 
time and mental capital.’68 Lilian BeVier asserts that ‘[p]rivacy is a chameleon-like word’ 
embracing ‘a wide range of wildly disparate interests’.69 For Judith Jarvis Thomson, privacy is 
‘not a distinct cluster of rights but itself intersects with the cluster of rights which the right over 
the person consists in and also with the cluster of rights which owning property consists in.’70 
A right to privacy, Thomson argues, derives from these higher-order interests.71 Raymond 
Wacks’ dismissal of privacy as an impoverished concept also emanates from a concern that it 
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has no distinct meaning other than as an umbrella term for other, discrete interests. Writing in 
1980, he argued that privacy had ‘become almost irretrievably confused with other issues’.72 
Discussion of privacy, in the view of these scholars, should be reduced to the discussion of 
discrete, conceptually smaller rights and interests. 
Another scholar whom we might also see as a reductionist is William Prosser. His 
famous taxonomy of four privacy torts fed into the USA’s Second Restatement of Torts 
continues to form the basis for American tort privacy to this day.73 Prosser exhibits a strong 
reductionist tendency because he sees the four privacy torts as being ‘distinct’ from one 
another; they have nothing in common, he insists, other than a loose notion that they protect 
the vague ‘right to be let alone’.74 Whilst Prosser was sceptical about the usefulness of 
conceiving of privacy as a unified concept, he did contribute significantly to American privacy 
jurisprudence by ‘creat[ing] clear and distinct categories where once only a whirling, 
undifferentiated chaos had been.’75  
Reductionists thus flag up some quite different aspects of privacy from the singular and 
interdisciplinary scholars. For they focus on the qualities of distinct interests that distinguish 
those interests from one another. It is not the similarities between them that matter to 
reductionists, but their differences. This reminds us that the search for a unifying theory of 
privacy – so sought after by singular scholars – is likely to encourage a potentially troubling 
degree of shoe-horning. 
 
C. The Pragmatic Taxonomy of Daniel Solove 
 
Having given a broad overview of major contributors to ‘mainstream’ privacy scholarship, we 
come now to the unique perspective of Daniel Solove. In Understanding Privacy, Solove offers 
a pertinent critique of rival privacy theories and proposes to understand privacy in a ‘pragmatic’ 
fashion.76 He claims to recognise and reflect privacy’s ‘pluralistic’ nature (suggesting that, 
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unlike most other scholars, he is alive to privacy’s multiple aspects). Given this, it is worth 
engaging with his work in some detail.77  
Solove is deeply critical of the ‘top-down’ method of conceptualising privacy.78 
According to Solove, this method invariably results in theories that are over-inclusive 
(identifying, as private, matters that ought not ordinarily to attract that label) or under-inclusive 
(matters that ought to be considered private are excluded). Indeed, Solove charges two 
prominent theories with falling into error on both counts.79 When he criticises theories in this 
way, he might be taken as charging them with exhibiting aspect blindness, in that they fail to 
recognise other aspects of privacy. 
Solove argues that any effort properly to understand privacy must be pragmatic, rooted 
in our experience of privacy.80 Rather than proceeding in a top-down fashion, Solove 
endeavours to conceptualise privacy from the ‘bottom-up’. In so doing, he aims to act like a 
cartographer, ‘mapping the terrain of privacy by examining specific problematic situations 
rather than trying to fit each situation into a rigid predefined category.’81 
In his search for an adequate understanding of privacy, Solove presents us with two key 
tools. First, he exhorts us to view privacy through the experiential lenses of actual ‘privacy 
problems’. This is because ‘philosophical inquiry begins with problems in experience, not with 
abstract universal principles.’82 For Solove, then, ‘[c]onceptualizing privacy is about 
understanding and attempting to solve certain problems.’83  
Second, Solove employs one of Wittgenstein’s concepts – that of ‘family 
resemblances’84 – as an alternative to locating common denominators between these ‘privacy 
problems’. According to Wittgenstein, not all related phenomena necessarily possess a 
common feature. But this does not prejudice the idea that such phenomena are in fact related. 
Like siblings, parents and grandparents, related phenomena can be expected to share certain 
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features. Yet, whilst each will share one or more characteristics with another, they will not all 
share the same characteristics. Solove’s point is that we need not expect all privacy-related 
matters to share the same common features, and in searching for them we can easily overlook 
others in the privacy family.85  
Having thus gotten to grips with Solove’s basic pragmatic methodology, we must now 
endeavour to determine the aspect(s) of privacy that his approach illuminates. In order to do 
so, we must consider the manner in which he conceptualises privacy’s value. Solove seeks to 
distinguish himself from both liberal and communitarian positions. Liberal theories of privacy 
traditionally focus on the individual’s privacy as a right in tension with the interests of the 
community; that is, they see the relationship between the individual and society as an atomistic 
one. As a pragmatist, Solove finds these liberal theories deficient on the basis that, when 
privacy is conceived as an individual’s right against the community, it tends to be undervalued, 
since ‘protecting the privacy of the individual seems extravagant when weighed against the 
interests of society as a whole.’86 Solove also rejects communitarian approaches to valuing 
privacy, since these ‘view the private sphere as antagonistic to the public sphere’, and ‘[pit] the 
individual against the common good.’87  
According to Solove, both the liberal and communitarian views of privacy (prevalent 
in mainstream scholarship) provide us with a particular aspect of privacy: privacy as an 
individualistic interest, in conflict with that of the community. It is important to note at this 
point that Solove does not try to embrace but instead rejects this aspect, since – as we shall 
shortly see – his doing so is at odds with his stated aim to ‘reconstruct’ a comprehensive 
understanding of privacy.88  
His own preferred approach to valuing privacy is to recognise the role of the individual 
within society and to ascribe a value to her rights insofar as they promote the collective common 
good; ‘[i]ndividualism should be incorporated into the conception of the common good, not 
viewed as outside it.’89 Seeing individual privacy as a social good can thus serve to enhance 
protection for individuals’ privacy interests. In this way, Solove identifies a distinct aspect of 
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privacy that runs counter to the antagonistic, individualistic aspect that he associates with 
liberalism and communitarianism. 
Solove’s claim is that the individual’s interest is itself part of the broader societal 
interest: ‘[p]art of what makes a society a good place in which to live is the extent to which it 
allows people freedom from the intrusiveness of others.’90 His claim, inspired by Dewey’s 
pragmatism, refuses to see the individual’s interests as separate from society’s: ‘we cannot 
separate the idea of ourselves and our own good from the idea of others and of their good.’91 It 
is important that we examine this claim closely, because it points up the most important and 
unique element of Solove’s scholarship. We must draw out this element if we are to accurately 
appraise the contribution that his work and pragmatic method can make to our triangulation-
based method of understanding privacy.  
Solove is best understood as endeavouring to bring a basic understanding of privacy to 
the fore. It is this that makes plain the ‘aspect’ of privacy that is unique to Solove’s work. We 
can tease out the basicness of his understanding by adopting a distinction between ‘functional’ 
and ‘conceptual’ meanings of words that features in the work of Martin Heidegger.92 In order 
to do so, it is necessary briefly to explain this distinction. 
The functional meaning of a phenomenon is that instinctive, intuitive meaning 
concerned with its purpose or the use to which it is put; it is a something-in-order-to-X. Thus, 
the functional meaning of a screwdriver is a something-to-screw-things-in-with; a mug a 
something-to-drink-coffee-from. Identifying this functional type of meaning raises two further 
important points. First, the functional meaning comes into view against the phenomenon’s 
‘background of intelligibility’;93 a screwdriver is only a something-to-screw-things-in-with 
because there is a thing that needs to be screwed in.94 Second, the functional meaning is the 
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most basic meaning that we attach to phenomena. It is the meaning we intuitively attach first 
to an object – often without even thinking about it.  
For Heidegger, the conceptual meaning – the label which we attach to the phenomenon 
– always arrives later; it becomes a short-hand term for a particular class of object that fulfils 
a particular function. Thus whilst, at a functional level, we would not distinguish between a 
mug, a tea-cup and a small bowl (each being potentially useful as a something-to-drink-coffee-
from), we attach different conceptual meanings – names – to each in order to construct and 
define a class to which each belongs.95 The conceptual meaning is therefore parasitic upon the 
functional one. So, according to Heidegger, a background of intelligibility (a contextual 
situation) yields a basic, functional meaning that we ascribe, intuitively, to a given 
phenomenon. Later, we ascribe one or more conceptual meanings to that phenomenon, which 
assist us in labelling and categorising it. This conceptual, labelling exercise is possible only 
because of an awareness of the more basic, functional meaning.96 This functional meaning is 
itself possible only because of an awareness of the object’s background of intelligibility. An 
intuitive understanding of an object in its context thus precedes any conceptual understandings 
of that object. 
Solove brings into focus the individual-in-society in a functional, rather than 
conceptual, sense. This distinguishes him from those who espouse liberal and communitarian 
conceptions of privacy – including ‘top-down’ privacy theorists. For they view the individual 
and the community as conceptual, rather than functional, objects. In conceptualising the 
individual and the community, however, it becomes easy to be inattentive their more basic, 
functional meanings. Solove’s work alerts us to this. When, instead, we view the individual as 
a functional phenomenon, we necessarily see the individual against her background of 
intelligibility.97 That is, we appreciate the role of the individual within society. Moreover, 
because the individual is born into society, and cannot help but be a constituent part of that 
society, the individual also provides a background of intelligibility against which to view the 
community as a functional phenomenon, as the community is comprised of individuals. Each 
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provides a background of intelligibility against which to view – in the most basic way possible 
– the individual and society, and thus to understand their interrelationship at its most basic.  
Assuming this analysis is accurate, through Solove we have uncovered an aspect of 
privacy that – far from being more conceptually sophisticated than the singular theories – is 
actually more basic. This is its strength. It is this that gives his work a unique position in this 
field of scholarship. Seen in the light of the foregoing analysis, the individual-in-society is the 
base, experiential phenomenon, upon which the conceptual individualistic and communitarian 
views of privacy (including the mainstream, ‘top-down’ theories) have parasitically developed. 
Unless their proponents at some intuitive (possibly pre-conscious) level were aware of this 
background, their theories would have no basis. In other words, the conceptual theories of the 
singular theorists necessarily imply (and are contingent upon) some degree of awareness of the 
basic phenomenon that is the individual-in-society. In arguing in favour of conceptualising 
privacy in this basic, functional way, Solove is actually making (by implication) a broader 
argument for a recalibration of the way in which we conceptualise individual rights. He 
suggests that we should view them as deriving neither from atomistic nor communitarian 
relationships between the individual and society, but rather from the background painted by 
their interrelationship.98 
 
4. Triangulating Privacy 
 
Having examined the aspects of privacy identified (and overlooked) by mainstream privacy 
theory (and the counter-mainstream work of Solove), we are now in a position to sketch out 
the triangulation-based method advocated in this essay. 
Taking cognisance of each of the major theories’ aspects enriches our understanding of 
privacy’s nature. By doing so, we can make room for ‘reasonable pluralism’ within the privacy 
debate,99 enabling us to accommodate a ‘degree of reasonable disagreement’ about what 
privacy means.100 Reasonable disagreement of this sort is helpful, for it points up privacy’s 
pluralistic nature – something that only rarely emerges in privacy scholarship. One way in 
which we can do this is by categorising different theorists in the way we outlined earlier 
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(identifying categories of singular theorists, reductionists and so forth). Such categorisation is 
possible because there is sufficient similarity between their theories that we can treat them as 
sharing broadly the same aspect perception in relation to the concept theorized.101 
Beyond grouping theorists together, however, there is another, significantly more 
helpful way in which we can make use of their work. This is to locate points of confluence – 
areas of overlap – between these different approaches to conceptualising privacy. One way in 
which we might characterise this approach is by reference to a notion of ‘triangulation’. In the 
sciences, triangulation refers – at a level of generality – to ‘the combination of methodologies 
in the study of the same phenomena’.102 The practice involves identifying areas of confluence 
between multiple sources of information. Such areas indicate the veracity of the conclusion 
upon which the various sources concur, in part because they help to alleviate the problem of 
agent-relativity that may arise when only a single source is considered.  
The approach outlined in this essay is not derived from any single, existing model of 
triangulation. It is instead an attempt to construct afresh a methodology that attends to the 
pluralistic nature of privacy and avoids falling victim to aspect blindness. However, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the approach proposed herein does have a broad, pre-existing correlate in 
‘theory triangulation’, a term coined by the renowned American sociologist Norman Denzin.103 
This refers to locating ‘multiple [as opposed to] single perspectives in relation to the same set 
of objects’.104 Denzin, who produced the leading taxonomy of triangulation methods in 
qualitative research, advocates approaching the analysis of data without the hindrance of a 
single, preferred theory. He prefers ‘approaching data with multiple perspectives and 
hypotheses in mind.’105 By proceeding in this way we can avoid being ‘aspect blind’ to 
analytical perspectives beyond our single, initially preferred theory and to the interpretations 
of the data they can provide. This is particularly useful when seeking to understand privacy. 
Denzin tells us that theoretical triangulation is necessary ‘in those areas characterised by a high 
degree of theoretical incoherence’.106 Privacy would appear to be a prime example of such an 
area since, as we have seen, mainstream theories tend to assume mutual exclusivity with one 
another.  
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The triangulation approach proceeds along the following lines. If we can locate 
particular acts (or ‘problems’, in Solove’s terminology) that scholars agree violate privacy – 
notwithstanding their different conceptualisations of the overarching concept – then these 
provide the areas of theoretical confluence that give us confidence in their veracity. We might 
term these areas of ‘strong consensus’. Such areas would provide us with pockets of sufficient 
certainty for us to take cognisance and make use of them, whilst still allowing for reasonable 
pluralism in respect of underlying rationales. Put simply, if numerous scholars agree that act X 
constitutes a prima facie privacy violation, we can be confident that, whatever ‘privacy’ means 
(and its meaning is of course contingent on the perceptual stance of its observer), it is broadly 
accepted as covering act X. So, what we need to do is look for areas of overlap between the 
different aspects we examined in the preceding section. This will enable us to triangulate an 
understanding of particular privacy problems that ought to be sufficiently determinate to form 
the basis of future legal doctrine.  
There is some similarity here with Solove’s approach. Solove talks of ‘mapping’ 
privacy, and expressly aims to provide an understanding of privacy capable of driving legal 
development.107 However, Solove sees no use for the mainstream scholarship that he criticises 
for its over- and under-inclusivity. He rejects it entirely, rooting his analysis solely in 
experiential ‘privacy problems’. There is undoubtedly great value in focusing on experiential 
problems – they give us the basic, functional understanding of the phenomena we are 
contemplating. But there is also considerable value in the scholarship that Solove rejects, for 
each scholar points up a relevant aspect of privacy.  
The practical usefulness of contextual, experiential analysis underpins its appeal to 
Solove.108 It is important to remember, however, that this mode of analysis involves a broad 
attentiveness to background context,109 which entails attending not just to the basic, functional 
aspects of a phenomenon, or to its conceptual aspects, but to both.110 For each provides a 
background of intelligibility against which to understand the other. It is for this reason that the 
mainstream privacy theories that are individually (and on their own terms) deficient must 
nonetheless be put to use. Rejecting them outright, as Solove does, amounts to a refusal to 
attend to privacy’s conceptual aspects. Ultimately, this will hinder both our understanding of 
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privacy and our efforts to shape legal doctrine in such a way as to protect it effectively. 
Identifying functional aspects of privacy, whilst also useful, does not render an appreciation of 
privacy’s conceptual aspects redundant. 
Mainstream theories may appear to be mutually exclusive, but they are mutually 
exclusive only in so far as they represent incompatible attempts to conceptualise privacy in an 
ultimate, all-encompassing way. The fact that these frameworks fail on their own terms to 
locate the mythical One True Meaning of privacy does not render them useless. They can be 
very useful, providing we are willing to use them in a way other than that for which they were 
intended. By doing something else with them, we can avoid their supposed mutual exclusivity. 
The mainstream theorists give us the conceptual understandings of privacy that complement 
Solove’s functional understanding. They establish frameworks by which the basic, functional 
understanding of privacy can be cognitively identified, separated, categorised and individuated 
in the manner that the development of particular legal rules tends to demand.  
Since the major doctrinal matter with which this essay aims to grapple is the absence 
of an ‘intrusion’ tort in English law, we will focus – for the purpose of exemplifying the method 
– on triangulating intrusion-type problems.111 That the act of intruding upon a person’s 
seclusion or private affairs violates that person’s privacy (and thus is, in a tortious sense, 
wrongful) can be shown to be an area of strong consensus. We will demonstrate this strong 
consensus by postulating the facts of three cases – Kaye,112 Jones113 and Holland114 – as 
putative, privacy-invading intrusions, and looking at the ways in which both mainstream 
scholars and Solove would respond to them.  
                                                          
111 The method, however, is not limited simply to looking at intrusion-type privacy problems. The whole point 
of the triangulation method is that it can bring into view types of privacy violation upon which there is broad 
agreement that would otherwise go unnoticed, given the well-known differences between the theorists upon 
whose work we have dwelt. 
112 In Kaye (n 17), a well-known television actor was photographed and ‘interviewed’ by journalists from the 
Sunday Sport who, without permission, gained access to the hospital room in which he was receiving intensive 
care following a serious road accident. 
113 Jones (n 18) is a case from Ontario, Canada, in which the defendant accessed (without permission) the 
plaintiff’s confidential bank records at least 174 times over a four year period. The defendant made no use of the 
information gleaned thereby, nor did she disseminate the information further. For further analysis of this case 
see Chris DL Hunt, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
Decision in Jones v. Tsige’ (2012) 37(2) Queens LJ 665; Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Privacy, Corrective Justice and 
Incrementalism: Legal Imagination and the Recognition of a Privacy Tort in Ontario’ (2013) 59(1) McGill Law 
Journal 49. 
114 Holland (n 19) is a New Zealand case in which the defendant was discovered to have surreptitiously video-
recorded the plaintiff in a state of undress having installed a hidden camera in their shared bathroom for that 
purpose. See further Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Emerging privacy torts in Canada and New Zealand: an English 
perspective’ (2014) 36(5) European Intellectual Property Review 298. 
 
All three cases represent variants on the classic intrusion scenario. In the 1991 English 
case of Kaye, journalists intruded into the hospital room of a vulnerable person receiving 
intensive medical care. Jones was a 2012 appellate case from the Canadian province of Ontario, 
in which the defendant accessed the plaintiff’s confidential bank records without either the 
plaintiff’s knowledge or permission. Holland, a New Zealand High Court case also from 2012, 
involved an act of voyeurism (video-recording a person in the shower). Each of these cases 
involves intrusive acts that would currently fall outside the reach of English tort law as it 
currently stands.115 If the information gleaned in each case were to be disseminated, these 
claimants would undoubtedly have valid claims for misuse of private information.116 But the 
intrusive acts themselves, without subsequent publication of information obtained, would not 
attract liability.  
 
A. Putative Intrusions and Scholarly Responses 
 
Gavison’s theory clearly embraces Holland-type intrusions as privacy violations, for they cause 
the plaintiff’s ‘spatial aloneness [to be] diminished’.117 Parker’s definition also picks out 
intrusions of this sort as offences against privacy. He himself gives the example of a woman 
who is spied upon while naked by a former lover.118 He regards this intrusive act as a privacy 
violation, but insists that it is so because more than control over information has been lost; she 
has lost control over who senses her. Parker’s treatment of this sort of Peeping Tom scenario 
aligns with Gavison’s, who likewise finds the act a privacy violation going beyond the mere 
acquisition of information.119 Whilst these writers dwell on the Peeping Tom scenario (rather 
than the non-sexual Kaye-type scenario) the fact that neither sees the violation as concerned 
                                                          
115 There would be avenues of redress in other causes of action, which might provide some relief. For example, 
Jones could be dealt with under data protection law (albeit more obviously against the bank than against the 
individual wrongdoer), whilst Holland would incur criminal liability for voyeurism. This does not mean, 
however, that English tort law ought not to develop its own protections for pure intrusions. I do not develop this 
point myself because it is not the purpose of this essay to argue for an intrusion tort, but rather to offer a solution 
to a conceptual problem currently inhibiting the development of one (assuming, arguendo, that such a move is 
desirable). An argument that liability would arise under Gulati for a Jones-type violation in England suffers 
from the problems discussed earlier (see n 3 and accompanying text). 
116 This liability would arise under the Campbell (n 11) doctrine. For reasons Moreham elaborates upon, 
describing what the ‘Peeping Tom’ gains or obtains by viewing or recording the victim’s naked form as 
‘information’ is not particularly intuitive nor comfortable. I use the term ‘information’ here to describe what is 
obtained in such situations here simply to make the point that disseminating such footage would attract liability 
under MPI. See Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law’ (2014) 73(2) CLJ 350, 355. 
117 Gavison (n 48) 433. 
118 Parker (n 37) 280. Moreham also uses this example: see ‘Liability for listening’ (n 3) 166. 
119 Gavison (n 48) 433. 
 
with the acquisition of information but rather as an intrusion into physical proximity (Gavison) 
or loss of sensory control (Parker) demonstrates that both would also see Kaye as a privacy 
violation. Moreover, Parker’s definition of privacy, which includes control over others’ ability 
to sense ‘objects very closely associated with us’,120 expressly includes safety deposit boxes 
within a list of typical such objects. As such, it is reasonable to postulate he would see the 
Jones-type intrusion into banking records as violating privacy. For Gavison, the Jones scenario 
would come under the element of secrecy and thus also constitute a privacy violation.121 
Likewise, Moreham sees these sorts of intrusion as very much concerning privacy: 
 
Privacy can … be breached by unwanted watching, listening or recording even 
if little information is obtained and none is disseminated. Peering through a 
person’s bedroom window … or surreptitiously taking for one’s own purposes 
an intimate photograph or video recording are … examples of this kind of 
intrusion.122 
 
These three scenarios would also breach privacy as conceptualised by Hughes. In the 
Kaye-type scenario, the defendants have breached both a physical barrier (by entering his room 
without permission) and a normative barrier (in that there is a social norm dictating that those 
recovering from serious injury ought not to be photographed and pressed for comment). In the 
Holland-type scenario, there is a clear breach of all three of Hughes’ barriers: physical 
(installing the camera in a place the plaintiff believes she is unobserved), behavioural (the 
plaintiff has intentionally secluded herself in order to use the bathroom) and normative (as 
evidenced by the fact the defendant realised he could succeed in his voyeuristic endeavours 
only by secreting the camera in a location where it could not easily be seen). As for the Jones-
type scenario, this may constitute the breach of a physical barrier (if the definition of physical 
covers the kinds of electronic walls present in secure computer systems – and there seems no 
reason why it should not) and also the normative barrier (in that the defendant has abused her 
position of trust as an employee of the bank in order to pry into the plaintiff’s affairs).123 
Benn, whose non-consequentialist theory is based on the value of human dignity and 
respect for the individual ‘as a person, as a chooser, … as one engaged on a kind of self-creative 
                                                          
120 Parker (n 37) 281. 
121 Gavison (n 48) 433. 
122 Moreham, ‘Beyond Information’ (n 116) 351, and ‘Privacy in the Common Law’ (n 9) 649-650. 
123 Bok (n 47). Bok’s conception of privacy embraces freedom from ‘unwanted access’ – including ‘physical 
access’ – and thus also covers these sorts of intrusive acts. 
 
enterprise’,124 also agrees. The right to privacy extends, he tells us, to (and, indeed, beyond) 
‘the claims not to be watched, listened to, or reported upon without leave.’125 Bloustein would 
concur, based on his similarly dignity-based aspect whereby violations of privacy are found in 
conduct that amounts to ‘an affront to personal dignity’.126 Both the Kaye and Holland 
scenarios fall squarely under their conceptions. As for Jones, it is not hard to square with 
Benn’s approach. For when the defendant accessed the plaintiff’s bank records, she failed to 
respect her victim as a ‘chooser’ – as a person who has the capacity to decide for herself with 
whom she shares her financial information. 
Solove places intrusion openly within his taxonomy and so we have no doubt that he 
views it as a privacy problem.127 He would see the Holland scenario as a problem not only of 
intrusion (of ‘disturb[ing] the victim’s daily activities, alter[ing] her routines, destroy[ing] her 
solitude and … mak[ing] her feel uncomfortable and uneasy’128) but also one of surveillance: 
‘[i]ntrusion into one’s private sphere can be caused not only by physical incursion and 
proximity but also by gazes (surveillance)’.129 Solove openly characterises Peeping Toms as 
engaged in surveillance,130 and cites a case131 in which a couple successfully sued their landlord 
for installing a recording device in their bedroom as one of surveillance.132 As for the Kaye 
scenario, this would fall squarely under both Solove’s ‘intrusion’ and ‘interrogation’ problems. 
The defendants both destroyed Kaye’s solitude and interrogated him (in conducting their 
‘interview’).133 
It is slightly harder to pinpoint where in his taxonomy Solove would place the Jones 
scenario. Because it involved accessing data records, one might expect him to place it within 
his ‘information processing’ group of problems. However, Solove makes plain that he sees this 
group as ‘not involv[ing] the disclosure of the information … to another person.’134 Rather, 
this group deals with privacy problems involving data ‘transferred between various record 
systems and consolidated with other data.’135 Nevertheless, given his thesis that privacy should 
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126 Bloustein (n 40). 
127 Solove (n 16) 161-165. 
128 ibid 162. 
129 ibid 163. 
130 ibid 107. 
131 Hamberger v Eastman 206 A 2d 239, 241-42 (NH 1964). 
132 Solove (n 16) 111. 
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be conceptualised from the bottom-up, we can expect him to find (or create) a place for the 
Jones scenario. It might well fit under his intrusion category, given his observation that 
‘[i]ntrusion need not involve spatial incursions’.136 It might also be characterised as a form of 
(non-consensual) interrogation.137  
Even the reductionists tend to agree that intrusive acts are wrongful, though they do not 
see it as a privacy issue per se, so it is worth examining what they might make of our three 
cases. Prosser was in no doubt when constructing his taxonomy that intrusion was wrongful 
(albeit as an empirical, rather than normative, exercise in observing the courts’ treatment of 
intrusion cases).138 All three cases would fit within that category. Indeed, in both Jones and 
Holland, the courts expressly made reference to the elements of Prosser’s intrusion tort when 
devising novel intrusion torts in Ontario and New Zealand, respectively.139 The Kaye scenario 
would constitute a classic Prosser-type intrusion: Kaye had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
whilst in his room, and the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.140 
Thomson similarly finds intrusive acts to be objectionable, since she finds that 
individuals have rights ‘to not be looked at and … not be listened to’.141 This clearly covers the 
Kaye and Holland scenarios. However, her treatment of Jones-type scenarios would be slightly 
different. For in instances of acquiring private information, Thomson considers the rights 
breached to be of the property genus: a person has a right to conceal property – including 
information – from others. Any unauthorised accessing of this concealed information 
constitutes a breach of that right.142 Her reasoning thus gives yet another rationale for the Jones 
scenario constituting a privacy violation – but her theory would agree with the others that it 
does constitute a wrongful act. 
 
B. Defending the Triangulation Method 
 
The analysis in this essay demonstrates that, despite the differences between the aspects 
of privacy that each scholar identifies, there is strong consensus surrounding the issue of 
intrusive acts. Methodologically, this is every bit as simple as it sounds. Intrusion is an issue 
                                                          
136 ibid 163. 
137 ibid 112-117. 
138 Prosser (n 73) 389. 
139 Jones (n 113), [18]; Holland (n 114), [94]. 
140 This ‘highly offensive’ element is perhaps just another way of ‘seeing’ Hughes’ notion of a normative 
barrier. See Prosser (n 73) 390-392; Hughes (n 53) 812. 
141 Jarvis Thomson (n 70) 304. Thomson does not see these as privacy rights as such, but rather as rights over 
the self akin to those people have in property. 
142 ibid 302-303. 
where multiple aspects of privacy overlap. In order to engage in this sort of analysis, it is 
necessary to exhibit broad attentiveness to privacy theories in the manner we have done. The 
discussion of privacy theories in earlier sections of this essay is not, and was not intended to 
be, exhaustive, but it is broadly representative of the most influential privacy theories of the 
last century.  
The triangulation approach has the advantage of being able to satisfy those with quite 
different views on the nature of judicial practice – something that has significant implications 
in terms of promoting its usefulness as a basis upon which to elaborate common law doctrine. 
For example, Hartian positivists may find satisfaction because a strong degree of consensus 
between otherwise divergent theories provides something close to a ‘core’ of (relatively) 
certain meaning.143 Meanwhile those who prefer a realist understanding of adjudication can 
take this emergent consensus as indicative of broader social mores surrounding privacy.  
Much of classic, formal legal method involves separating and filtering things out – 
distinguishing that which is ‘relevant’ from that which is not. The triangulation approach cuts 
against the grain of this traditional common law method because it directs that we should not 
filter particular theories of privacy out of our reasoning simply because they are not obviously 
and on their own terms compatible with a view of privacy that we have come to accept. We 
should instead regard all privacy theories as relevant, and from there move to ask whether this 
multitude of relevant material displays any degree of consensus on a particular issue.  
In this essay, we have focused on the issue of intrusion. We have not encountered any 
mainstream privacy theory that would deny that a pure intrusion into a person’s seclusion is a 
violation of that person’s privacy. Even the reductionists, whilst sceptical of the term ‘privacy’, 
regard intrusions as wrongful. However, even if we did locate such a theory, there would still 
be strong consensus amongst the vast majority of privacy scholarship that intrusions amount to 
wrongful invasions of privacy. There will, of course, be other issues – beyond intrusion – upon 
which there is far less consensus. Whether a brain-dead person has a right to privacy, for 
example, would attract far less consensus; some of the theories we have examined would say 
there would be such a right (eg on dignity grounds), whilst a focus on ‘desired inaccess’ might 
deny such a right on the basis that the victim is incapable of holding any such desire.144  
There will be theories of privacy not herein discussed which would weigh in on one or 
other side of that argument. According to the triangulation method, all such theories are 
                                                          
143 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012) ch 7. 
144 See Moreham (n 51). I should be clear that I am not attributing such a view to Moreham but merely pointing 
up one conclusion that the broad thrust of her ‘desired inaccess’ theory might point towards. 
relevant to the decision of whether to recognise such a right or interest. If there is no discernible 
consensus on a particular issue, then this approach will not provide a solid basis to develop the 
law in respect of that issue. But in such circumstances, the classic, top-down approach adopted 
by much of the mainstream would also fail to provide a solid basis for legal development; 
picking one amenable theory over others would be arbitrary and beset by agent-relativity. Thus, 
in the worst case scenario (no consensus) the triangulation method leaves us no worse off, 
whilst in cases where a degree of consensus can be located, it assists by pointing up that 
consensus where, under a top-down methodology, it would go unnoticed. 
 I anticipate at least three objections to my argument, which ought to be pre-emptively 
dealt with. It might be objected that my assertion that ‘all’ privacy theories are relevant to the 
triangulation method asks too much of the courts. An objection along these lines might also 
point out that this essay has not referred to all of the scholarly privacy theories in the world, 
which calls into question the practicality of attending to them and also flags up the potential 
for relativistic selectivity. To this, I make two points. First, the assertion that all privacy theories 
are relevant is intended as a corrective to the unhelpful practice (pursued by those thinking 
along top-down theoretical lines) of filtering out theories that do not align with a preconceived 
notion of privacy. It is also an invitation to cast a wide net and exhibit broad attentiveness to 
the range of theories that are out there, whilst allowing for novel theories to emerge (and to 
disclose hitherto unseen aspects of privacy). It is not a directive to make a decision only once 
we are sure that we have located every possible theory. All of this must fall within the 
overarching schema of a standard of proof that is, in English and Welsh civil law, set at the 
balance of probabilities. The point is simply that a greater amount of theoretical evidence is of 
more use than a lesser amount. Beyond that, it is not desirable to set absolute limits. Second, 
agent-relative selectivity is nothing new in judging. Fully objective adjudication is not humanly 
possible. Given this, the problem of selectivity may be present, but only because it is pervasive 
in law. My proposed approach makes the problem far less acute than persevering with the top-
down method which is, of course, not only also coloured by selectivity but which encourages 
the selection of only one theory. For ‘[t]riangulation … is a plan of action that will raise 
[observers] above the personalistic biases that stem from single methodologies.’145 
A second objection to my argument might point out that I have not given any precise 
indication of just how much ‘consensus’ there needs to be around a concept before it amounts 
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to ‘strong consensus’ and becomes useful. This would be a charge of vagueness. My response 
to such a charge would be that there can be no definite, bright-line definition of ‘strong 
consensus’. It is a matter of degree. The more consensus there is, the stronger it is.146 The test 
of the usefulness of the triangulation method in pointing up areas of consensus is whether it 
proves useful for elaboration of the common law. All I am claiming is that areas with the 
strongest consensus provide pockets of reasonable certainty as to privacy’s scope and that these 
may prove useful to courts as they consider recognising novel heads of liability to deal with 
putative privacy violations. 
It might also be objected that the lack of a consistent message from these scholars in 
respect of an underlying rationale explaining the wrongfulness of intrusion weakens the level 
of consensus on the matter. To such an objection I would say that the consensus necessarily 
exists only at a level of generality, and does not – indeed cannot – exist at the level of a rationale 
for privacy. For the very notion that privacy has a single, true rationale is the myth that causes 
mainstream theories to be mutually exclusive. It is this that we must move beyond. 
Commentators may (and, no doubt, will) continue to disagree on a number of issues – for 
instance, the point at which the ‘intrusion’ takes place, what makes it an ‘intrusion’ in the first 
place and the reason why it is wrongful. There continues also to be disagreement as to how we 
are to define the areas of life that are thought to be worth protecting from intrusion. In arguing 
that there is strong consensus on the issue of intrusion, I do not deny that these disagreements 
persist. 
However, it is necessary to recall that a key feature of the common law is that it is 
reactive. Courts deal with cases after the fact. And they deal with those cases by examining 
fact-patterns holistically. Each of the scholars upon whom we have dwelt (in this section) 
would agree that the totality of the circumstances that came to bear on the claimants in the 
cases outlined above represented intrusions into those claimants’ privacy and that the intrusions 
were wrongful. They may agree on this for different reasons. They may, individually, believe 
that the ‘intrusions’ take place at different points (when the camera is placed in the shower,147 
                                                          
146 See Gerald J Postema, ‘Protestant Interpretation and Social Practices’ (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 283, 
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147 At the point at which the perpetrator installs a camera with the aim of recording the victim in a state of 
undress (at some point in the future), the perpetrator has acted with wilful disregard for the dignity of the victim. 
For those theorists, such as Bloustein (n 40), who see privacy as an aspect of personal dignity, the activity is at 
this point objectionable. 
 
when the camera begins to record,148 when the video file is accessed,149 and so forth). Such 
disagreements are inevitable and should not trouble us unduly. For none of these distinctions 
matter much to the courts when they are dealing, reactively, with a complete set of 
circumstances that has been laid before them. What matters is whether the totality of the 
circumstances can clearly be seen to amount to an intrusion and whether that intrusion is 




The analysis offered in this essay demonstrates that it is possible to deal with privacy in a 
workable fashion more usefully than seems to have been widely appreciated – particularly by 
theorists engaged in top-down analyses. By triangulating the various aspects of privacy we 
have encountered, we can locate pockets of certainty in areas where there is strong consensus 
on the privacy-violating nature of the activity under scrutiny. Intrusive conduct, on this 
analysis, falls within such a pocket; notwithstanding widespread disagreement about the nature 
of privacy, there is widespread agreement that intrusive conduct of the sort identified in our 
three example cases is (a) a violation of privacy and (b) wrongful. 
This demonstrates that the apparent conceptual difficulty inhibiting the recognition of 
broader or novel privacy torts at common law is, in reality, an illusion. Nothing about our 
capacity for understanding privacy absolutely prevents us from using it as a basis for the 
                                                          
148 Solove would say that, at this point, a process of surveillance is in operation, which raises a privacy problem. 
He would also see the recording of a person who is in a secluded space as an invasion of that space. See Solove 
(n 16) 107 and 164. 
149 At the point at which the video file is accessed, the perpetrator is, in essence, observing the victim. For 
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(which would require courts to be attentive and open to that perspective), we would find that there is a sufficient 
degree of consensus on the matter of intrusion (as set out above) to provide a basis for that initial, and perhaps 
broad, precedent. Such a precedent is, of course, something that English privacy law is currently lacking. See 
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979); Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton University Press 1990), 
Dyson Heydon, ‘Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law’ (2001-2004) 10 Otago Law Review 493, 
Stephen R Perry, ‘Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law’ (1987) 7(2) OJLS 215, 240-241, and 
Michael Tugendhat, ‘Privacy, judicial activism and democracy’ (2018) 23(2) Communications Law 63. 
 
development of legal doctrine. Yet the illusion remains a powerful one. Its power mainly comes 
from the obvious lack of agreement on the abstract nature of privacy and the widespread 
scholarly divergence on this point, itself largely driven by a narrowly-focused, insular 
insistence on trying to locate the One True Meaning of privacy. This has clearly troubled the 
courts.151 The solution required to overcome the apparent conceptual difficulty is, then, 
relatively simple: the adoption of this approach of triangulation to understanding privacy on a 
problem-by-problem basis.  
Recently, it has once again become fashionable amongst privacy academics to argue 
for the recognition of an intrusion tort in English and Welsh law. Recent such arguments centre 
on the notion that the existing misuse of private information doctrine has already reached the 
point where it encompasses a proto-intrusion tort and could be extended with no great difficulty 
by way of further judicial fudging of the sort that gave rise to the action for misuse of private 
information in the first place.152 Such arguments implicitly accept the existence of the apparent 
conceptual difficulty with which this essay has been concerned, starting from the basis that the 
separate recognition of a stand-alone intrusion tort is judicially unthinkable. 
The triangulation-based method indicates, however, that we need not accept such a 
starting point. There is no need for those urging the courts to recognise an intrusion tort to 
resign themselves to arguing for ever greater shoe-horning of intrusion-type violations into the 
misuse of private information doctrine. The idea that a standalone intrusion tort is unworkable 
on conceptual grounds is a false one. And since arguing for the recognition of an intrusion tort 
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